(1) Problem Definition: We consider an entrepreneur designing a rewards-based crowdfunding campaign for an innovative product. The crowdfunding platform uses a fixed funding mechanism: if total pledges meet a funding target, the campaign is successful, the entrepreneur receives all donations, and backers receive the product. Otherwise, the campaign fails and backers are refunded their pledges. Product quality is known to the entrepreneur but unknown to some backers. We study how the entrepreneur can signal quality to backers via the design of the crowdfunding campaign.
Introduction
Crowdfunding, the process of funding a project or venture by raising many small pledges from a large number of individuals over the internet, has experienced dramatic growth in the past decade (Forbes 2012) . As of 2016, crowdfunding volume rivals venture capital funding, and by some estimates is expected to reach $90 billion by 2020 (Forbes 2015) . There are many types of crowdfunding, including equity-based, debt-based, charity-based, and rewards-based. In this paper, we focus on the last type: rewards-based crowdfunding, in which entrepreneurs raise funds through platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo to develop new products. Prior to the advent of crowdfunding, to bring such products to market, entrepreneurs needed to first secure some form of This unique combination of features allows rewards-based crowdfunding to remedy the three problems discussed above with traditional financing and selling of new products. First, the platform website streamlines the process and reduces the cost of raising funds and selling the product.
Second, by avoiding traditional lenders and investors, the creator has relatively more freedom in designing her campaign and her product. And third, the fixed funding mechanism serves as a method for creators to ensure demand is sufficiently high before committing to produce the item.
Thus, in essence, the fixed funding mechanism allows creators to make production contingent on the level of demand, whereas a more traditional retail-focused approach would require that production occur before demand is observed.
Despite these advantages, there are drawbacks to the crowdfunding model. One of the most significant is that rewards-based crowdfunding inherently depends on soliciting donations from backers before the product has been brought to market. This leads to an information asymmetry problem:
when selling on a crowdfunding platform, the creator knows the quality of her product while backers must make investment decisions without this information. This information asymmetry problem gives creators the opportunity to disguise the quality of their product, which introduces significant risk for potential backers and impacts both the financing and consumption of the product, due to the conflated nature of these roles in a crowdfunding campaign. To mitigate this problem, crowdfunding platforms have introduced several features. On Kickstarter, creators who give physical products as rewards need to have a fully functioning prototype of the reward while running a campaign. Creators are encouraged to provide as much information about the product as possible including expected shipping dates for rewards and possible risks that might delay or derail the project. Creators are also prohibited from uploading any computer rendered video or image of the product on their webpage. Besides designing sophisticated fraud detection algorithms, Kickstarter also encourages backers to report any suspicious activity on the platform.
Nevertheless, such measures are far from perfect, and for every crowdfunding success story, there are numerous examples where campaigns received significant funding, only to later disappoint backers with low quality finished products. For example, the Pebble smartwatch is one of the most successful Kickstarter campaigns of all time, raising over $10 million in 2012 while simultaneously exceeding consumer quality expectations and establishing Pebble as a leader in the smartwatch industry (MIT Technology Review 2016) . In the exact same product category, however, the Kreyos smartwatch, launched with a similar target and price as the Pebble, raised over $1.5 million, but the final product was significantly delayed and backers were disappointed to find that the devices lacked many of the promised features and were often defective. Another notorious example is Zano, a campaign for small drones that raised ₤2.3 million, making it the most successful European campaign of its time. However, as with the Kreyos smartwatch, Zano's creators delivered rewards to a handful of backers before declaring bankruptcy, leaving the remaining backers in the lurch.
An independent journalist hired by Kickstarter discovered that the creators promised advanced product features in the campaign that were beyond their expertise (Medium.com 2016) . In both instances-and numerous other examples (Gizmodo 2014 )-creators masked the low quality of their offerings and convinced a large number of small, uninformed backers to donate to their campaigns.
These examples point to an inherent information asymmetry problem in the crowdfunding model that persists despite the best efforts of platforms like Kickstarter: campaign creators know more about the likely quality of the finished product than potential backers, and they may mislead backers in an attempt to increase their profits. In a traditional financing and selling model, this type of information asymmetry is likely to be less severe. On the financing side, traditional lenders and investors have the resources and the expertise to investigate the veracity of a creator's claims about the quality of her product and the feasibility of her project, but a similar level of scrutiny cannot be expected from the many individuals that comprise the crowd (Isenberg 2012 , Agrawal et al. 2013 . On the selling side, once a product has been released in a retail store, it is much easier for consumers to judge the quality and to rely on the expertise of others (e.g., professional reviewers or friends) who have experience with the product to minimize any uncertainty about the product's value, and even to return products they are unsatisfied with for a refund; on the contrary, potential backers of a crowdfunding campaign may not receive the finished product until months after the campaign has ended, and hence are incapable of evaluating the finished product with the same level of detail as consumers in a retail store. Consequently, crowdfunding exacerbates the problem of information asymmetry both at the funding and selling stages, and the inefficiency generated by this information asymmetry could have far reaching consequences for the viability and profitability of crowdfunding campaigns.
In this paper, we explore how private quality information impacts rewards-based crowdfunding.
Specifically, we study a stylized model in which a creator starts a crowdfunding campaign with a single unit of the finished product as the only reward. The product can be either of high or low quality, and the creator of a low quality product might try to disguise her product as a high quality product. While all backers value the high quality product more than the low quality product, only a fraction of backers are "informed" and can correctly infer product quality without any signal from the creator. Another segment of backers are "uninformed," and the creator can signal product quality to these backers via her choice of the reward price and funding target. Using this framework, we consider the following research questions. First, how can creators optimally design rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns in the presence of asymmetric quality information to credibly signal product quality ( §4)? Second, when signaling is possible, how does it affect the creator's incentive to design a high quality product ( §5)? Third, how should a creator modify her signaling strategy when backers have significant outside options and hence a non-zero reservation utility ( §6.1)? And fourth, can dynamic learning by backers based on the current contribution level to the campaign help alleviate the information asymmetry problem ( §6.2)?
Literature Review
Our paper is related to two streams of literature: signaling product quality and crowdfunding. The literature on asymmetric information about product quality and signaling began with Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) . Since these seminal papers, there has been substantial work on various ways to signal product quality, including via price (Bagwell & Riordan 1991) , advertising (Kihlstrom & Riordan 1984 , Milgrom & Roberts 1986 , warranties (Spence 1977 , Grossman 1981 , money back guarantees (Moorthy & Srinivasan 1995) , limiting product availability and creating a scarcity (Stock & Balachander 2005) , choosing a slower service rate to create a longer queue (Debo et al. 2012) , and rationing capacity in an advance selling period (Yu et al. 2015) . Kirmani & Rao (2000) provide an overview of the quality signaling literature. Our paper adds to the literature on quality signaling through price by incorporating the unique features of rewards-based crowdfunding, i.e., the fixed funding mechanism and the associated funding target.
In contrast to the literature on signaling product quality, the literature on crowdfunding is far more recent and less extensive; Kuppuswamy & Bayus (Forthcoming) and Moritz & Block (2016) provide a detailed survey of this growing area. Works that consider the creator's optimal campaign design and issues of adverse selection or moral hazard are particularly related to our model. Among these, Chang (2016) considers a moral hazard problem where the backers are not certain whether the creator will actually deliver the rewards or run away with the money raised from the campaign.
Strausz (2017) studies a similar moral hazard problem and show that the optimal crowdfunding mechanism should implement deferred payments to the creator, a practice used by platforms like PledgeMusic. Chemla & Tinn (2017) compares fixed funding with an alternate funding scheme called flexible or keep-it-all funding in the presence of similar moral hazard issues. The authors find that the value of learning the uncertain demand is high enough that it allows the firm to endogenously overcome moral hazard by choosing fixed funding with a high target. Miglo (2016) and Xu (2017) consider the capability of creators to receive feedback from backers during the campaign that helps the creator to learn about demand and improve her product. Both Chen et al. (2016) and Babich et al. (2017) consider the information generated from the performance of a crowdfunding campaign and study its effect on the creator's choice between crowdfunding and more traditional ways of fundraising like venture capital funding. None of these papers consider information asymmetry about product quality between the creator and the backers. Belavina et al. (2017) study crowdfunding in the presence of performance opacity (i.e., backers do not observe the quality of the product) and moral hazard (i.e., the creator may not deliver the reward), and show that such issues force high performance entrepreneurs to seek alternate sources of fundraising. Belleflamme et al. (2014) also study crowdfunding with asymmetric information about quality using a model that is quite different from ours. In their paper, the backers are heterogeneous in their valuations and there is no demand uncertainty. Our work thus incorporates an important element of the crowdfunding problem that is not addressed in Belleflamme et al. (2014) , namely the way creators can use target funding levels to help mitigate the impact of demand uncertainty as well as signal product quality. Sayedi & Baghaie (2017) consider a signaling model in which creators signal their competence in producing a reward; a low competence creator needs a higher start-up cost to manufacture a product of the same quality. Our paper differs from Sayedi & Baghaie (2017) in two key ways. First, we suppose that the quality of the product is decided even before the creator starts the campaign while in their model the creator can decide the quality after the campaign.
Second, we focus on general crowdfunding campaigns, and unlike them, do not consider a secondary retail market after the campaign. In addition to the theoretical work on signaling in crowdfunding, there is also limited but growing empirical research on the topic, with somewhat conflicting results: Frydrych et al. (2014) find that a lower target signals legitimacy of a campaign, while Devaraj & Patel (2016) find a higher target signals higher quality. Our work adds to this stream by providing theoretical support for the use of a higher target level to signal a higher quality product.
Model
A creator sells a new product via a campaign on a rewards-based crowdfunding platform with a single unit of the product as the only reward. We consider the fixed funding mechanism, in which the campaign is deemed successful and the creator receives the pledges and is obliged to deliver rewards as long as the total pledges received by the campaign meet its funding target. Otherwise, the campaign fails, backers are refunded their pledges, and the creator does not deliver any rewards.
The creator thus sets the reward price p and the funding target C, and we call (C, p) the design parameters of the campaign.
Backers
Our model of asymmetric quality information is similar to Bagwell & Riordan (1991) and Stock & Balachander (2005) in that we assume that the product can be either of high or low quality. For brevity, we refer to the high quality product and its creator as "H-type" and the low quality product and its creator as "L-type." backers have homogeneous valuations v H and v L for the H-type and L-type products, respectively, where v H > v L . This difference in quality can arise in multiple ways.
First, there could be differences in the attributes or performance of the rewards delivered by the creators; indeed, such uncertainties are common with the type of new, innovative products typically launched via crowdfunding platforms. This would directly lead to a difference in utility from the products offered by the two creator types.
Second, there could be differences in the capabilities of the creators to successfully deliver rewards to backers. Most creators on crowdfunding platforms are novice entrepreneurs and typically do not have prior interactions with their supply partners, making successful execution of the production process risky for backers; indeed, a survey of backers revealed that around 9% of campaigns on Kickstarter either failed to deliver rewards or delivered a reward that was different than what was promised in the campaign (Mollick 2015) . Differences between creators in their ability to successfully deliver rewards could generate v H and v L if, for instance, backers are homogeneous in their valuations for the products of both creator types (call it v) but the H-type creator delivers the product with probability x H while the L-type creator delivers with probability x L , where 0 < x L < x H < 1. When a backer pledges to the campaign of a creator of type i ∈ {H, L}, he fails to receive the reward (and hence loses its utility) with probability 1 − x i , leading to an expected
Although backers are homogeneous in their valuations, they are heterogeneous in their knowledge about the creator's type, e.g., they are heterogeneous in their ability to accurately assess the features of the product or to determine whether the creator has high likelihood of delivering the product, x H , or low likelihood, x L . A prospective backer who is an expert in a particular product category will be able to discern the value of the reward or the probability of reward delivery with a higher degree of accuracy. We call these backers "informed" and suppose that they are perfectly knowledgeable about the true quality of the product, and so pledge as long as p ≤ v L for the L-type and p ≤ v H for the H-type. Other backers, with less expertise, may have a more difficult time assessing this information; we call these backers "uninformed". Uninformed backers do not know the creator's true type, and must determine this information based on the design of the campaign and their common prior belief b ∈ (0, 1) of the probability that a product is of H-type. After observing C and p, uninformed backers form a posterior belief b that the product is H-type, and pledge to the campaign as long as their expected valuation exceeds the selling price, i.e., if
The total number of backers interested in pledging to the campaign is a random variable N , which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,N ] . We denote the probability density function of this random variable N as f (·) = 1 N . Uninformed backers comprise a fraction α of the total number, N , of backers while the the remaining fraction are informed backers.
We also consider a third category of backers, referred to as "fans", who are very enthusiastic about the product idea or the broader product category and want to support the campaign. Since these backers care about the success of the campaign besides maximizing their own utility from using the product, they might act "irrationally" and be willing to pledge at a higher price than the regular (i.e., informed and uninformed) backers (Slate 2014) . These backers are also more likely to participate in any preliminary market research and product survey conducted by the creator, making it easier for the creator to estimate the size of this backer population. To reflect these facts, we assume that the fans would pledge to either type of campaign at any price up to v H and the number of fans, N F , is known (as opposed to an uncertain number of regular backers). To avoid trivial outcomes where the creator sets a high price and raises money only from the fans, we suppose that N F <N and N F v H < S L ; i.e. neither creator can achieve success only from the pledges received from the fans.
Backers visit the campaign in a random order. Although, it is possible for the uninformed backers to observe the pledge level of the campaign and infer quality from the pledging decisions of the informed backers, the "irrational" pledging by the fans creates a noise and partially obfuscates any such information conveyed. Hence, making accurate inferences about product quality solely from the current number of pledges will be quite challenging for potential uninformed backers, and indeed there are few tractable models of information cascades with limited amounts of information in economics, marketing, and operations; see Veeraraghavan & Debo (2009) for a discussion of this issue. Such inefficient herding is often observed in practice: a case in point is Skarp, a campaign for a "laser razor" that received over $4 million in pledges despite posting a video on the campaign webpage that showed a prototype which was extremely ineffective (The Verge 2015). Since the safety measures introduced by the crowdfunding platforms to ensure an accurate representation of quality are also not foolproof, the information asymmetry problem calls for the creators of genuine campaigns to find some other way to reliably communicate the quality of their product to the backers. This is precisely our focus in this paper. Hence in our base model in §4, we do not allow the uninformed backers to observe the pledge levels of the campaigns and let them learn product quality solely from the creator's campaign design (C, p). In §6.2, we consider an extension where this restriction is removed.
To focus on the information asymmetry about product quality, we assume that all backers know N F and α and are aware that the regular backer population is uniformly distributed in [0,N ] . In our base model in §4, backers are risk neutral and incur no additional opportunity cost while pledging to the campaign. In case of campaign failure, their pledges are refunded, and as a result the chance of campaign failure does not encourage backers to strategically delay or forgo pledges (see Alaei et al. 2016 and Chakraborty & Swinney 2016 for models of such a dynamic, which arises when backers explicitly experience a cost to participating in a campaign or delaying a pledge). Backers thus pledge to a campaign as long as their expected surplus from contributing is non-negative, given their type (informed or uninformed), prior beliefs about the quality of the creator's product, and any information learned by observing the design parameters of the creator's campaign. §6.1 relaxes this assumption and considers an opportunity cost arising from pledging for backers.
The Creator
We assume the creator has perfect information regarding her type, i.e., the creator knows whether she is L-type or H-type. In practice, it may be the case that there is also uncertainty for the creator regarding the value of her product or her chance of delivering her rewards; however, even in this case, it is likely that the creator possesses more information about these factors than the uninformed backers. To keep our analysis parsimonious, we assume that the creator possesses perfect information, although it would be straightforward to consider imperfect information for the creator as well, provided that information is more accurate than the information possessed by the uninformed backers.
Manufacturing either type of product requires a fixed cost and zero variable cost. The fixed cost for the H-type and L-type products are S H and S L respectively, where S H ≥ S L , reflecting the fact that greater development and start-up costs are typically required to develop higher quality products, make production more reliable, or increase the probability of delivering rewards to the backers. These fixed costs represent the expense of moving from the preliminary design phase (which has typically been completed before the campaign begins) to prototyping and full scale production, and once the creator has invested the fixed cost, she can satisfy all demand without incurring any additional expense. We model positive fixed costs and zero variable costs for two reasons.
First, fixed costs are essential for incorporating one of the key elements of fixed funding rewardsbased crowdfunding, i.e., to ensure production commences only if demand is sufficient to guarantee profitability. Second, provided the margin on a H-type product is greater than that of an L-type product, positive variable costs would have minimal impact on the results and underlying forces governing the creator's actions, reducing the profit of each unit sold but not fundamentally altering the fact that the creator seeks to design a campaign to ensure profit is sufficiently high to justify moving forward with production and incurring the expense of the fixed cost. Hence, for ease of exposition, we focus on the more salient of the two costs: the fixed cost. For i ∈ {H, L}, we assume that S i < (N + N F )v i . Together with N F v H < S L , this means that for either type of creator, the likelihood of campaign success is in (0, 1). If the campaign is successful, the crowdfunding platform charges a certain percentage (presently 5% for both Kickstarter and Indiegogo) of the total pledges received by the campaign. We have ignored this fee for simplicity; though it can be easily included as a constant multiplicative factor.
The creator designs her campaign by choosing an appropriate funding target C and price p to maximize her total expected profit at the end of the campaign, which is her net income from the campaign after paying the start-up cost. Throughout our analysis we have focused our attention only on the campaign and have disregarded the possibility of a secondary retail market where the backers and other customers have another opportunity to purchase the reward and creators can earn additional revenue. We do this for three reasons. First, while it is true that many campaigns particularly those in the design, technology, and video game category continue to be ongoing ventures for which the products can be purchased on a secondary market (Mollick & Kuppuswamy 2014) , these are still exceptions and not the rule in the context of rewards-based crowdfunding. Many campaigns belong to categories like theater, music concerts, dance performances, art projects, etc. and are just one time events with no future value for the creator or the backers. Second, most campaigns do not receive enough popularity, raise only a modest amount, and are never launched in a secondary market.
Only about one-third of all campaigns started on Kickstarter are successful and over two-thirds of all successful campaigns on Kickstarter raise less than $10,000. Less than 3.5% of all successful campaigns primarily belonging to design, technology, or games category receive over $100,000 in pledges (Source: https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=global-footer. Accessed on 01/26/2018.) Even for campaigns that continue to be ongoing venture, considering a secondary market is not straight-forward. On the backers' side, Mollick (2014) finds that 75% of campaigns deliver products later than expected with delays being longer for campaigns that raise more money. Another survey of backers revealed that 35% of campaigns were late in delivering the reward (Mollick 2015) . Many of these highly successful products also go through subsequent rounds of investor funding and are then launched on the retail market. Therefore, successful campaigns might take a while before having a product available on the secondary retail market. Moreover, in the absence of product failure risk, to not pledge to the campaign and wait for the secondary market. On the creator's side, the relationship between campaign profit and future revenue is uncertain and quite complicated. Many campaigns go through subsequent rounds of fund-raising from venture capitalists, angel investors, or other sources (Mollick & Kuppuswamy 2014) , where interestingly, more campaign profit might not always translate into more funding (Babich et al. 2017 , Chen et al. 2016 . Hence, calculating the (campaign performance dependent) expected post-crowdfunding value, if any, even before launching a campaign can be difficult for the creator. Thus, focusing only on the campaign allows us to derive insights that are generally applicable to most crowdfunding campaigns irrespective of their size or reward category.
We consider a sequential game of incomplete information. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and analyze two possible types of equilibria: separating, in which the uninformed backers can distinguish the two types perfectly, i.e., where b is either 0 or 1, and pooling, where the uninformed backers do not learn any new information from the creator's campaign design, i.e., where b = b . PBE allows us to set arbitrary beliefs for strategies that do not lie on the equilibrium path. As is common in these situations, we assume that if such a strategy is ever observed, the uninformed backers would believe that the deviating creator is of L-type, i.e. b = 0.
Another common feature of signaling games with PBE is a continuum of equilibria; we thus employ the intuitive criterion (Cho & Kreps 1987) for refining the set of equilibria and identify a unique equilibrium whenever possible. An equilibrium will fail the intuitive criterion when the creator of one type can deviate and be better off, provided the uninformed backers recognize her true type, while the creator of other type would be strictly worse off by resorting to this deviation, no matter what type the uninformed backers perceive her to be. In other words, whenever the uninformed backers observe a deviation that strictly dominates the equilibrium strategy of one type but makes the other type strictly worse off, they can be absolutely sure that it is the former type that had deviated and not the latter, and the focal equilibrium would not exist.
Optimal Campaign Design
In this section, we derive the optimal campaign design for creators of both types in both separating and pooling equilibria. Any separating equilibria must satisfy the following properties. First, the Ltype should find it preferable to reveal her true type rather than mimic the H-type. This means that in a separating equilibrium, the L-type would adopt her preferred complete information strategy.
Second, the H-type should find it preferable play her equilibrium strategy rather than deviate to an off-equilibrium path where she saves the signaling cost and sells only to the fans and the informed backers. We begin by first analyzing the optimal creator decisions under complete information, i.e., when all backers know the value of the creator's product. From the model preliminaries discussed in the previous section, the expected profit of a creator of type i ∈ {H, L} is
She maximizes her profit over C and p subject to the constraints C ≥ S i (so that she can always incur the start-up cost and deliver rewards if the campaign meets its target) and p ≤ v i . We then have the following result for the full information case: Proposition 1. Under complete information, a creator of type i ∈ {H, L} sets C = S i and p = v i .
Consequently, in the presence of information asymmetry, the L-type sets C = S L , and p = v L in any separating equilibrium.
Proof. All proofs appear in the online supplement.
In the absence of information asymmetry, the creator sets the lowest possible funding target given her fixed costs, S i , and the highest possible price at which backers would still be willing to pledge, i.e., p = v i . The target allows the creator to produce and deliver the reward only at high demand states when the campaign has received sufficient pledges to cover the start-up cost. It is easy to see that as the target C increases, the risk of campaign failure increases; consequently the expected profit decreases. Hence, at optimality, C = S i . Note that in this full information scenario, the optimal campaign design is independent ofN , the parameter of the demand distribution.
Under information asymmetry, the L-type creator can either set (S L , v L ) or mimic the H-type.
To discourage mimicking and enable separation, the H-type must thus set her campaign parameters (C, p) such that it is no longer profitable for the L-type to mimic. Observe that when separating herself from the L-type, the H-type's signaling power comes from the fact that both informed and uninformed backers find her product more valuable. All backers, informed, uninformed, and fans, would be willing to pledge to a H-type's campaign at a price p ≤ v H . However, if a L-type decides to mimic a H-type's price and funding target and sets a price higher than v L , she would only be able to sell to the fans and the uninformed backers, while the informed backers would find the product too costly and would not participate. Besides, lowering her demand, mimicking the H-type requires the L-type to increase the funding target by C − S L from her preferred target S L . In comparison, the H-type's distortion, C −S H from her preferred target S H , is smaller. Both these factors increase the risk of campaign failure for the L-type creator and decrease her expected profit.
Broadly speaking, the H-type can signal by either distorting her funding target, the price of her rewards, or both simultaneously. We first consider the case where the H-type sets her preferred complete information target S H and uses only her reward price to signal quality. Let
Proposition 2. When using price alone to signal quality, there exists an α * > 0 such that the H-type sets a funding target C = S H and (i) When α ≤ α * , she sets a reward price p = v H .
(ii) When α > α * , she sets a reward price p * (α) =
The separating equilibrium does not exist if α ∈ (α * , 1 −
and
Note that when α ≤ α * , the number of uninformed backers is so low that the L-type would never try to mimic the H-type (as this would result in a significant loss in demand from informed backers).
Thus, the H-type can set her preferred complete information price v H and earns a constant expected profit. In this region, separation is achieved with zero signaling cost; consequently, this range of values of α can be called the region of costless separation.
However, for higher values of α the number of uninformed backers is significant, and mimicking the H-type becomes profitable for the L-type. In this case, costless separation is not possible, and the H-type needs to set a lower price than her preferred full information value (v H ) to separate herself from the L-type. From Proposition 2 and Figure 1a , we see that H-type's equilibrium price decreases with α. This achieves separation from the L-type creator by making it costly for her to mimic via a reduction in revenues received upon campaign success: specifically, the L-type loses informed backers when mimicking the H-type, and by reducing the price, the H-type reduces the potential revenues earned from the uninformed backers. Hence, in this case, separation is achieved by limiting the upside profit potential.
Moreover, as the equilibrium price decreases, the H-type's profit decreases; the difference between this profit and her full information profit is her signaling cost. Therefore, the signaling cost increases with the fraction of uninformed backers, α. From Proposition 2, we also note that the separating equilibrium may not always exist when price is the sole signaling device. This is because the H-type would earn higher expected profit by deviating from this equilibrium and charging a price of v H , selling only to the fans and the informed backers. From Figure 1b , observe that this deviation is only profitable for intermediate values of α. Signaling is less costly when α is lower (the signaling cost is zero when α ≤ α * ); while for higher values of α, the uninformed backers make up the majority of the market and the H-type has less incentive to deviate and abandon the uninformed backers (when
, the H-type's campaign will always fail from this deviation).
The proposition illustrates that price alone can be used to signal quality in rewards-based crowdfunding, but doing so is costly to the H-type creator: the reduction in price required to separate from the L-type is so great that, in some cases, the signaling equilibrium does not even exist. Consequently, in the next proposition we consider another possible signaling equilibrium in which the H-type creator varies both of her campaign design parameters, price and funding target, to signal quality: Proposition 3. When using price and the funding target to signal quality, a separating equilibrium always exists. In any separating equilibrium the H-type finds it optimal to charge the full information price, p = v H . Moreover:
As noted previously, the H-type creator could conceivably signal high quality by simultaneously adjusting both the reward price and funding target; however, the preceding proposition shows that the H-type always finds it optimal to set her full information price v H and, instead, vary her funding target to signal quality. When α ≤ α * , she sets her preferred complete information target S H and signaling is once again costless. Beyond this region, she increases her target with α, i.e., sets a larger target than the complete information level (see Figure 2a) . As the funding target increases, the risk of failure increases and expected profit decreases. Thus, separation is achieved in this case not by lowering the revenues achieved from each potential backer, but rather by making success less likely via a higher funding target: this is preferred by the H-type creator to signaling with price because it does not reduce revenue in high demand states (as the price is equal to the full information value, v H ), but rather, only in low demand states, when profit would already be low. In addition, unlike the case when price alone is used as a signal of quality, the separating equilibrium exists for all values of α. Consequently, we conclude from Proposition 3 that the funding target is a more effective signal of quality than the reward price, or indeed than any combination of the two campaign parameters.
To further illustrate this point, Figure 2b compares the creator's expected profit under the two separating mechanisms (price and funding target) using parameters such that the signaling equilibrium in Proposition 2 always exists. Since the L-type always separates herself by signaling her preferred complete information design parameters (S L , v L ), her expected profit remains constant as a function of α. When α ≤ α * , i.e., in the region of costless separation, the H-type creator also sets her preferred complete information design parameters (S H , v H ) under both signaling mechanisms, and earns the same expected profit in both cases. However, once α > α * separation becomes costly, which can be observed from the H-type's downward sloping expected profit curves under both mechanisms.
More importantly, note that her expected profit is higher when she is uses the funding target as a signal compared to the case where she uses price. As the creator increases her target while keeping price constant, the probability of failure increases and expected profit decreases. Similarly, decreasing price while keeping the target constant decreases both the chance of success (since more pledges are now required to meet the target) and the revenues obtained if success occurs (the upside demand potential in very high demand states). The latter mechanism thus leads to significant cost to the creator, and as explained above, the effect of changing price can be so insidious that the H-type creator may stop signaling and forego pledges from the uninformed backers. Therefore, using the funding target is a more efficient way of signaling quality than using price. Since the choice of how to separate (i.e., by varying the target or by varying the price) depends only on the H-type creator, and she always (weakly) prefers to separate by varying C and, indeed, this may be the only equilibrium that exists, we conclude that separation by varying the campaign target is the H-type's dominant strategy. expected profit than the L-type because of her higher fixed start-up cost S H and the signaling cost. This highlights the important role that informed backers play in shaping the outcome of the campaign. We elaborate on the implications of this finding in §5 when discussing the incentives of a creator to invest in a high quality product. We also note that the funding target can only be used as a signal if backers are aware of the start-up cost S H and S L . Although we assume that the number of regular backers is uniformly distributed for mathematical convenience, our results are not driven by this assumption. We find that the H-type creator would prefer to set price v H and separate only by raising funding target even for other probability distributions (see figure 3 ). Now that we have discussed the dominant separating strategy for H-type creators, let us consider one last possible outcome: a pooling equilibrium. In any pooling equilibrium, both types of creators set the same campaign design parameters (C, p). First note that the H-type can only set this target if C ≥ S H . By definition in a pooling equilibrium, uninformed backers cannot distinguish the two types after observing the campaign design parameters. Since they do not learn any new information, they do not update their prior beliefs b , and hence would only pledge as long as The result of this proposition is intuitive. In any pooling equilibrium the H-type can charge a price lower than v H . Therefore, there almost always exists campaign design parameters with a higher price and a target compared to (C, p) that makes the H-type better off, as she can sell to all backers, but makes the L-type worse off, as she cannot sell to the informed backers. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium with (C, p) does not survive the intuitive criterion. The only case when pooling does survive the intuitive criterion is when α = 1 and both backers have the same start-up cost. In this case, there are no informed backers who can identify the true type of a creator, and because of the equal start-up cost, the H-type has no signaling power. Hence, we conclude that pooling equilibria can occur only under very specific circumstances: when quality is not associated with a difference in start-up costs, and when no informed backers exist in the market.
The Creator's Product Design Decision
We have thus far assumed that the quality of the product is exogenously determined; in other words, we have examined the campaign from the point at which the design of the product is, for the most part, finalized. However, in practice, creators must at some earlier stage determine the product's quality, i.e., they must choose whether to be L-type or H-type creators. In this section, we consider this decision. Specifically, suppose that at this earlier stage the creator incurs a "design and development" fixed cost F i to convert her initial idea to a preliminary product design of quality i ∈ {H, L} that will subsequently be posted on the crowdfunding platform. She then starts a campaign on the platform with a prototype of this design to raise funding, and if the campaign is successful, she will incur the quality specific start-up cost S i and begin production.
We assume that 0 ≤ F L ≤ F H , i.e., it is cheaper to design a low quality product. 
Therefore, when the creator chooses quality in an earlier period, she might prefer to have an L-type product over an H-type product if there are sufficiently many uninformed backers, a result formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. There exists someα ≤ 1 such that, for all α >α and any design and development costs satisfying 0 ≤ F L ≤ F H , the creator might choose to develop a low quality product.
This suggests that signaling costs may cause creators to forgo the development of high quality products on the crowdfunding platform, particularly if those products are very new or innovative (resulting in few informed backers) and high quality is associated with greater fixed costs at both the design and production stages.
On the other hand, consider a product that is more commonplace and less innovative, such that quality is easily assessed by, e.g., experts or experienced individual backers. In other words, α for this product is significantly smaller than 1. Since the signaling cost for this product is lower, the H-type creator's profit is greater than the L-type's, i.e., Π H (
is not too high compared to F L , profit net of design costs will be greater under the high quality product, i.e., Π H ≥ Π L . Thus, based on our analysis, we may conclude that most highly innovative (high α) products on crowdfunding would be of low quality, whereas more moderately innovative or commonplace products (low to moderate α) are likely to be of high quality, as long as the cost to design the high quality product is not significantly greater that of the low quality product. The relative values of consumer willingness-to-pay and the start-up costs have a similar effect on the the creator's design choice: for instance, if v H is not high enough compared to v L or if S H is very high compared to S L , a creator is more likely to design a low quality product. From Proposition 3, observe that the these conditions lower the H-type's profit while not affecting the L-type's profit.
Therefore, under these conditions, a creator will not be interested in incurring a higher fixed cost F H and will opt for a low quality product.
Extensions
In our base model, we showed that signaling is always possible and signaling via the campaign target is the preferred strategy. In this section, we consider how these results can change in two important ways. In §6.1, we examine the role of backer reservation utility in influencing the campaign design decisions of the creator. In §6.2, we consider how the creator's signaling strategy is modified when the backers are capable of inferring information about the quality of the campaign by observing the number of contributions made upon arrival and dynamically updating their beliefs.
Backer Reservation Utility
In the base model, we showed that the H-type creator prefers to separate by setting a high campaign target. This high target increases the risk of failure, but still allows the creator to capture upside revenue potential in high demand states. However, in practice, when a campaign fails, backers themselves may experience some cost due to the lost opportunity of having committed their funds in a different way; for instance, they could have pledged to another campaign that was successful, or they could have simply used their funds for consumption of another good altogether. Hence, in practice, backers have outside options, and because of this they have a reservation utility that they compare the campaign utility against when determining whether to pledge; it follows, then, that the increased risk of failure from a high target might influence their pledging decision and cause them to choose their outside option instead, ultimately deterring the creator from using a high funding target as a signaling device. In this section, we explore this issue by explicitly incorporating a backer reservation utility.
Specifically, we modify our base model by incorporating an explicit reservation utility, h(< v L ) that is the same for both informed an uninformed backers. This reservation utility acts as a threshold, and backers pledge to the campaign only if their expected net utility from doing so exceeds h. Since the fans want to help the creator, we assume that they have zero reservation utility. On observing C and p, the uninformed backers infer the product quality, and the informed and uninformed backers calculate the probability of success φ = P r(N ≥ C/p − N F ). Their net utility from pledging to a i-type campaign, where i ∈ {H, L}, is v i − p if the campaign succeeds and zero if the campaign fails. Hence, they pledge only if their expected net utility, φ(v i − p) ≥ h.
Note that an alternative interpretation of h is a hassle cost that is paid upon pledging and is not refunded if the campaign fails (e.g., the cost of completing the transaction or the financial cost of commuting funds to the campaign); hence, this cost represents some added risk for backers who participate in a campaign that eventually fails.
Unlike the base model in §4, which is just a special case with h = 0, the informed and uninformed backers' decisions now depend on the creator's target through φ, and they will no longer pledge when p = v i . In particular, the inequality, φ(v i − p) ≥ h, is true only as long as
For any C ≤C(v i ), the price p must satisfy p(v i , C) ≤ p ≤ p(v i , C), where
Note that if we increase C, p(v i , C) decreases while p(v i , C) increases; i.e., the range of prices at which the informed and uninformed backers will pledge decreases. We assume that h is low enough so that S i <C(v i ) (i.e., it is possible to design a campaign that can cover the fixed startup costs; otherwise the creator cannot use the crowdfunding platform). This also implies that
e., the probability of success is in (0, 1). Let us also define another
. Therefore, p * (C, α) increases with C. Finally, let C * be the solution to p * (C, α) = p(v H , C), provided the solution exists (i.e., as long as p(v,C(v H )) < p * (C(v H ), α), and equal toC(v H ) otherwise. The next proposition describes the resulting separating equilibrium: Proposition 6. When using both price and funding target to signal quality, (i) Under complete information a creator of type i ∈ {H, L} sets C = S i and p = p(v i , S i ). Hence under information asymmetry, the L-type creator will set C = S L and p = p(v L , S L ).
(ii) There exists an α * > 0 such that (a) When α ≤ α * , the H-type creator will set C = S H and p = p(v H , S H ).
(b) When α > α * , the H-type creator will set C = C * and p = p * (C * , α).
The separating equilibrium is depicted in figure 4 . The key insight from the proposition and the figure is that, when faced with a non-zero reservation utility, the creator can no longer, in general, signal by adjusting the campaign target alone. Outside of the region of costless separation, the creator must simultaneously raise the target and lower the price. The lower price serves two purposes: one, it increases the utility of backers upon success of the campaign, and two, it allows the H-type creator to set a lower campaign target while still separating herself from the L-type creator, thereby increasing the probability that the campaign is success. Both of these serve to increase expected backer utility from the campaign, allowing the creator to meet or exceed the backer's reservation utility. Thus, while reducing the price was not necessary with zero reservation utility, with positive reservation utility it becomes necessary for the creator to reduce the risk to backers participating in campaigns by employing a more "conservative" campaign design.
Finally, note that the separating equilibrium may not always exist, for two reasons. First, when the H-type creator sets a target ofC(v H ) and signals by decreasing the price, the price required to separate from the L-type, p * (C(v H ), α), might hit the lower limit p(v H ,C(v H )). Beyond this point, neither will she be able to increase the target further, nor will she be able to decrease the price further, and a signaling equilibrium cannot exist. Second, the H-type might find it preferable to sell only to the fans and the informed backers by deviating from the signaling equilibrium and setting the complete information campaign design (S H , p(v H , S H )). Thus, the additional cost of signaling induced by backer reservation utility may cause the creator to abandon a signaling strategy altogether and sell only to a smaller subset of the population.
Dynamic Backer Learning
In the base model, we followed the standard approach used in much of the signaling literature and derived an optimal campaign strategy that separates the H-type creator from the L-type creator based purely on information conveyed in the design of the campaign. In other words, we assumed that backers do not incorporate any information that may be conveyed in the status of the campaign itself upon their arrival (e.g., the number of contributions made to the campaign) when updating their beliefs about campaign quality. This "static" approach-in which even the first arriving backer is induced to participate in the campaign-may be appropriate if the goal of the creator is to induce all arriving backers to participate, if backers are incapable of correctly incorporating information or updating their beliefs, or if information about the current status of the campaign is kept hidden from backers.
However, in practice, it may be possible for backers to learn in a dynamic fashion by observing the number of contributions to the campaign upon their arrival, and using this information-in addition to the design of the campaign-to update their beliefs about campaign quality. In this section, we consider this possibility by supposing that an uninformed backer observes the number of previous pledges received by the campaign, n, and bases his posterior belief about product quality on C, p, and n (as opposed to just C and p in the base model). Although the creator can set C and p, for a particular uninformed backer, n depends on the order in which the backers arrive. Moreover, an individual backer cannot observe the types of the previous backers. Therefore, observing n allows the uninformed backer to make a noisy observation of the pledging decision made by the informed backers and further learn about product quality.
This information, n, can serve as an additional indicator of the quality information that a Htype creator previously had to convey through her campaign design. This may alter the creator's strategy and allow her to rely on information conveyed in n rather than information conveyed in C and p alone to convince uninformed contributors of the quality of her product. In other words, instead of choosing a campaign design that perfectly and immediately signals campaign quality and incurring a high signaling cost, the H-type creator may now choose a campaign design that can in principle be mimicked by the L-type, but allow the uninformed backers to infer quality by observing n, achieving signaling in a less costly way. Hence, dynamic learning by backers broadens the set of campaign designs available to both creators.
No Equilibrium
Because dynamic learning significantly complicates the model and analysis, for analytical tractability, we study a simplified version of our base model. Specifically, we suppose that there is only one backer of each type, and each of them visits the campaign with probability θ ∈ (0, 1). When the uninformed backer visits the campaign, he observes the number of previous pledges, n, but not who arrived before him (so he does not see the types of participating backers, nor does know whether any backers arrived and chose not to participate in the campaign). The details of the analysis of the dynamic learning extension are included in Appendix B; here, we briefly summarize the insights that result from that analysis. We let p 0 be the uninformed backer's updated expected valuation of the product after observing zero contributions upon his arrival to the campaign, and p 1 be the updated expected valuation after observing one contribution to the campaign. It follows that v L < p 0 < p 1 < v H (see Appendix B for details).
The outcome of this game is plotted in Figure 5 . When v H and v L are relatively close to another, costless separation exists; the H-type creator designs her campaign in accordance with our base model to signal quality immediately to all arriving backers. When v H is greater but b (the prior belief of high quality) is not too high, the outcome is a costly separating equilibrium in which the H-type creator perfectly signals quality to all arriving backers; however, unlike in our base model, the creator may find it preferable to signal quality by lowering the campaign price rather than always raising the campaign target. Lowering the price is optimal when the prior belief that the product is of high quality (b ) is high; in this case, there is only a minimal reduction in price that is necessary to signal quality, and hence the creator finds this preferable to the significant increase in campaign target that may be required (due to the discreteness of our simplified model in which there are only three backers).
While these cases are similar to the outcomes in the base model (i.e., achieving either costless or costly signaling by adjusting the campaign target or price), an interesting difference from the base model can be observed in when both v H and b are large. In this case, the outcome is either a pooling equilibrium or a non-existence of any equilibrium. In the former case (a pooling equilibrium), both creator types choose the same campaign design, while in the later case (no equilibrium), uninformed backers form an incorrect belief and pledge to an L-type campaign at price p 0 (> v L ). Thus, in the absence of signaling, even perfectly rational uninformed backers might pledge to a bad project at a high price when they base their pledging decisions only on the actions of other backers. This observation can provide a plausible explanation behind campaigns like Kreyos, Zano, and Skarp raising large amounts of funds on crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter-if the high value product is significantly more valuable than the low value product, and backers expect that most campaigns are of high quality, it is possible for a pooling equilibrium to emerge.
Taken together, this implies that when uninformed backers include n in their posterior belief, the H-type creator might not have the incentive to separate by incurring a signaling cost, and may instead rely on contribution information to induce backers to participate in the campaign. In turn, this can lead to the emergence of pooling equilibria or no equilibrium at all. Interestingly, this means when uninformed backers can update their beliefs based on the number of previous pledges, their overall informativeness might in fact decrease because of pooling or non existence of any equilibrium. Hence, by showing backers this information in an attempt to create positive herding, platforms like Kickstarter might, ironically, be worsening the information asymmetry problem.
However, Figure 5 shows that the regions of pooling and no equilibrium exist only at certain values of θ, while regions of separating equilibrium always exists and spans a majority of the parameter space (costless separation is the only outcome if θ ≤ 2 3 ). Hence, the results developed in the base model will continue to hold in most cases, and signaling via the campaign design is possible and indeed optimal in many cases.
Conclusion
The emergence of rewards-based crowdfunding over the past decade has streamlined and simplified the entrepreneurial process: entrepreneurs releasing new products now have a low cost, straightforward selling mechanism that complements the traditional ways of fundraising, while allowing them to diminish loses arising from low demand compared to other usual ways of selling new and innovative products. Crowdfunding has its own challenges, however, and information asymmetry is among the most difficult to overcome. Our paper has sought to address this issue by considering how a creator selling a new product on a rewards-based crowdfunding platform can design her campaign to signal private information about the quality of her product. We find that a creator can signal high quality by setting a higher campaign target than would otherwise be optimal under full information: this high target makes it costly for a low quality creator to mimic, because this would significantly reduce her chance of achieving the target. The optimal funding target distorts further from the full information level as the fraction of uninformed backers increase. As a result, the signaling cost for a high quality creator also increases as this fraction increases above a threshold.
While a high quality creator can also signal by lowering her price while keeping her full information target, lowering the price is costlier than raising the target because changes in price affect the creator's profit in all demand states while changes in the target affect only low demand states.
This makes the funding target a better signal of quality, and the high quality creator can virtually always distinguish herself from the low quality creator using this mechanism. By contrast, a pooling equilibrium, where both types of creators set the same price and target making it impossible for the uninformed backers to identify the true type of the creators, is quite rare and can arise only in the extreme case when there are no experts to correctly identify product quality and quality is not correlated to start-up costs. Therefore, our findings suggest that, in general, backers can infer product quality on crowdfunding platforms by observing the campaign design chosen by the creator, and this may provide an effective alternative to information mechanisms designed by the platform (requiring videos, etc.) or backers attempting to learn via informational cascades (observing the decisions of other backers). This result changes slightly when backers have attractive alternative ways of investing money and hence, are reluctant to pledge to a campaign with a high funding target and a consequent high failure risk. To attract pledges in such cases, the creator also lower the price simultaneously to moderate the increase in target.
We also show that information asymmetry pushes the creators to choose low quality products when there are few informed backers. In other words, creators have an incentive to either design high quality but low innovation (low α) products, or low quality but high innovation (high α) products, provided the demand remains relatively unchanged. This finding suggests that the popular belief that rewards-based crowdfunding encourages relatively inexperienced entrepreneurs to experiment with bold, new ideas may not always be true: under information asymmetry, the more innovative the product, the larger the number of uninformed backers in the market, and hence the greater the signaling cost, which in turn reduces the quality of the creator's product. This shows that information asymmetry can have a substantial impact on the creator's revenue.
Importantly, we also show that price may be a necessary component of the signaling mechanism of creators when backers have a substantial reservation utility, i.e., there is a significant outside option, hassle, or opportunity cost to making a donation. In this case, raising the target too much will make pledging to a campaign risky for backers, and to lessen this risk, the creator must reduce the price of her campaign. In turn, this lowers the profit of creators and increases their signaling cost. Hence, if platforms can lower this reservation utility and making transacting on the platform less costly, they can both making pledging to campaigns less risky for backers and make signaling quality more efficient for creators. Lastly, we show that the information asymmetry can actually be exacerbated by backers that attempt to incorporate information conveyed in the number of pledges to their beliefs about campaign quality. Such dynamic learning by backers may cause creators to rely on this learning rather than signaling via campaign design, settling for a pooling equilibrium in which both creator types choose the same campaign design and backers are more prone to participating in low quality campaigns. Thus, backers (and platforms) should be careful about using and displaying campaign contribution information in real time, as this can have unintended consequences for creators and backers alike.
In sum, our results illustrate the significant consequences of information asymmetry in rewardsbased crowdfunding. As this funding model continues to expand as a simple, accessible way for entrepreneurs to bring new products to market, dealing with the advantages (and disadvantages) of crowdfunding will become increasingly important. Our findings thus provide guidance for backers, creators, and platform designers on the consequences of, and remedies to, one of the most pernicious aspects of the crowdfunding model: asymmetric quality information.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Expected profit under the complete information scenario for a creator of type i ∈ {H, L} is
≤ 0, so optimal C = S i for any price p.
Also note that
Her profit increases in p and decreases in C and she would set p = v i and C = S i and earn
. Since the L-type sets her preferred complete information parameter in any separating equilibrium, she would set (S L , v L ) even when there is information asymmetry.
Proof of Proposition 2:
From the proof of Proposition 1, note that in a complete information setting, the H-type would set (S H , v H ) and earn
Now suppose that to signal her true type under information asymmetry, the H-type sets (S H , p)
where p ≤ v H and
If the L-type mimics the H-type, she would only be able to sell to the fans and the uninformed backers and earn
, and 0 otherwise (since her probability of success is 0 when
. This condition can be simplified to (S H , p) , the right hand side increases with α and p while the left hand side is a constant with respect to both. Therefore, the highest p satisfying this inequality,
(αN +N F ) 2 > 0. Now suppose the H-type creator sets a price p such that
Since Π H (S H , p) increases in p, the H-type can deviate to the strategy pair S H , p + , where > 0 and infinitesimally small such that p + < min v H ,
, and increase her expected profit while the L-type would be strictly worse off from making this deviation. So the only price that survives the intuitive criterion is p = min v H ,
. The optimal price set by the H-type can therefore be characterized as follows:
. In this case H-type's optimal price is v H . As mentioned above, the L-type would not mimic (S H , v H ) either if
, the H-type can separate by setting (S H , v H ).
decreases with α, and at α = 0,
Therefore, there exists an α * ∈ (0, 1] such that costless separation exists for any α ≤ α * .
≡ p * , and p * decreases with α. This case is valid when α > α * . Since
, the H-type will always be able to set this price and have a strictly positive probability of success. Hence, the H-type's equilibrium strategy is (S H , v H ) when α ≤ α * and (S H , p * ) otherwise. Finally note that when α > α * , the H-type can deviate from (S H , p * ) and set (S H , v H ) to sell only to the fans and the informed backers. In this case,
0 otherwise. The H-type will only make this deviation if
The separating equilibrium will not exist if this inequality is true.
Proof of Proposition 3:
suppose that to signal her true type under information asymmetry, the H-type sets (C, p) where
, and 0 otherwise (since her probability of success is 0 when (C, p) . This condition can be simplified to
, where (C, p) , for a fixed C, the right hand side increases with α and p while the left hand side is a constant with respect to both. Therefore, for a fixed C, the highest p satisfying this inequality,
(αN +N F ) 2 > 0. Now for any C ≥ S H , suppose the H-type creator sets a price p such that
. Since Π H (C, p) increases in p, the H-type can deviate to the strategy pair C, p+ , where > 0 and infinitesimally small such that p+ < min v H ,
would survive the intuitive criterion. We encounter two cases while finding the maximizing C.
. In this case p = v H . Since the H-type can choose any C ≥ S H , she is better off with C = S H . As mentioned above, the L-type would not mimic (S H , v H ) either
2 decreases with α, and at α = 0,
Therefore, there exists an α * ∈ (0, 1] such that costless separation exists for any α ≤ α * . Observe that α * is same as in proposition 2.
increases with C and decreases with α, C * increases with α to preserve the equality. For any C > C * , the H-type can only set p = v H . Since she will earn a higher profit with C = C * , she will not choose any C > C * . Therefore, she
, the H-type can always choose such a (C, p) and have a strictly positive probability of success. In this case, differentiating Π H (C, p) with respect to C yields, dΠ H (C,p) dC > 0. Thus, once again C = C * and
). Therefore, when α > α * , the H-type will set (C * , v H ). Hence, the H-type's equilibrium strategy is (S H , v H ) when α ≤ α * and (C * , v H ) otherwise. Finally note that when α > α * , the H-type can deviate from (C * , v H ) and set (S H , v H ) to sell only to the fans and the informed backers. In this case,
< (1 − α)N + N F , and 0 otherwise. Hence, the H-type will not make this deviation if
The last inequality can be simplified to
The last inequality is greater than zero since
and this deviation is not profitable for the H-type. Hence, the separating equilibrium always exists.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose both types of creators set (C, p) to pool. Any such (C, p)
By setting (C, p), the L-type could only sell to the fans and the uninformed backers and earn
S L as long as C p < αN + N F , and 0 otherwise. A necessary condition for pooling is that
. We will refer to the left hand side as E and the right hand side as B. The necessary condition can be simplified to p ≤
and the necessary condition holds only if
. On the other hand, the H-type can sell to all backers by setting (C, p) and earn Π H (C, p) =
Next suppose the L-type deviates to another set of campaign design parameters (C 2 , p 2 ), where p < p 2 ≤ v H and C 2 > C, such that the uninformed backers mistake her for the H-type, and
. However, the facts that p 2 > p and
The equality of L-types expected profit under these two campaign designs
From the equality of profits we can also write
. Next, suppose that the H-type can deviate to (C 2 , p 2 ) and still be recognized as the H-type by the uninformed backers. Then,
. Substituting the value of p 2 − p from above,
with equality holding only if α = 1 and S L = S H . By the intuitive criterion, a pooling equilibrium with (C, p) cannot exist as long as Π H (C 2 , p 2 ) > Π H (C, p) . In all such cases, the H-type would deviate to (C 2 + , p 2 ), where > 0 and infinitesimally small, and be better off while such a deviation would make the L-type worse off. Note that when α = 1 and S L = S H , the profit function of the L-type and the H-type are identical. Hence any deviation from (C, p) that makes the L-type worse (better) off will also make the H-type worse (better) off and the pooling equilibrium with (C, p) will exist. We finally need to check that for any feasible (C, p) with
. Combining the two conditions on E we must have,
and the condition is always satisfied. At the same time, the inequality (αN + N F )p 2 > C 2 must also be true. Observe
. The inequality follows from p > C αN +N F which is always true under pooling.
Therefore, when pooling with (C, p) where C ≥ S H and
and the pooling equilibrium will not exist due to the intuitive criterion except when α = 1 and
1) and pooling can always occur.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Follows from the discussion in §5.
Proof of Proposition 6: First consider a complete information scenario. For the campaign design (C, p), the probability of success φ(C, p) = P r(N ≥ 
. Note that the discriminant is non
. Therefore, the creator cannot set any C > C(v i ). Also note that dp(v i ,C) dC < 0 while dp(v i ,C) dC
As in proposition 1, for any acceptable (C, p),
> 0 and
Hence for any C, the optimal price is p(v i , C).
. Since the L-type sets her preferred complete information parameter in any separating equilibrium, she would 
. This condition can be simplified to
, for a fixed C, the right hand side increases with α and p while the left hand side is a constant with respect to both. Therefore, for a fixed C, the highest p satisfying this inequality,
Now for any C ≥ S H , suppose the H-type creator sets a price p such that
. Since Π H (C, p) increases in p, the H-type can deviate to the strategy pair C, p + , where > 0 and infinitesimally small such that p + < min p(v H , C),
, and increase her expected profit while the L-type would be strictly worse off from making this deviation. So the only price that survives the intuitive criterion is p = min p(v H , C),
. Also, among all C ≥ S H , only those that maximizes
. Note that p(v H , C) decreases with C, while
increases with C. If the H-type chooses any C > S H , her price would be lower than p(v H , S H ) and she is better off by setting (S H , p(v H , S H )). As mentioned above, the L-type would not mimic
Hence, for all values of α satisfying
, the H-type can separate by
decreases with α and at α = 0,
2 . There can be two possible scenarios. First,
. In this case, the H-type creator can choose C ∈ [S H ,C(v H )] and set
. For any C >Ĉ, the maxi-
. Since she earns a higher profit with C =Ĉ, she will not choose any C >Ĉ. To unify the two scenarios, we define C * such that C * =C(v H ) under the first scenario and C * =Ĉ under the second sce- . Note that the left hand side of the inequality is independent of α (except through C * ) and decreases with C * while the right hand side decreases with α and increases with C * . Therefore, as α increases, C * increases to preserve equality and p * (C * ) = p(v H , C * ) decreases. However, when C * =C(v H ), C * is independent of α while p * (C * ) = Note that b (1) > b (0) for any b and θ. After observing n ∈ {0, 1, 2} and a price and target that could be set by either type of creator, an uninformed backer's expected valuation for the reward is
There are thus four possible prices a creator will set: v L , p 0 , p 1 , and v H . Any intermediate price is strictly worse than the next one in this list. We assume that v H < S L ≤ S H ≤ 2v L for simplicity. This assumption implies that the L-type cannot achieve success just by setting a price of v H and receiving a pledge from the F-type backer, and allows us to focus on the more interesting case where the creators need pledges from the informed and uninformed backers. Therefore, in this section we study the case where
For each p ∈ {v L , p 0 , p 1 , v H }, we constrain the creator to choose between two targets: 2p and 3p. As a result, the number of pledges required for success for a given target is independent of b and the relative values of v H and v L . This means that either type of creator can always choose among eight possible campaign designs. For each campaign design, we first consider the most optimistic scenario for each creator wherein the uninformed backer is able to identify the H-type creator correctly but mistakes the L-type as the H-type. The expected profit of the creators from each campaign design under this optimistic scenario is shown in table 2. There are several points to note from this enumeration. First, all backers would always pledge at price v L ; hence, all creators would prefer (2v L , v L ) over (3v L , v L ). Second, setting (3p, p) for any p ∈ {p 0 , p 1 , v H } results in zero expected profit for the L-type creator even under the optimistic scenario. Because of this and because of the previous observation, we can conclude that L-type would never design her campaign with (3p, p) for any p ∈ {v L , p 0 , p 1 , v H }. Third, from the previous two points it follows that (3v H , v H ) strictly dominates (3p, p) for any p ∈ {v L , p 0 , p 1 } for the H-type as the L-type would not mimic any of these campaign designs. We further reduce the strategies of each type of creator by considering the following cases.
Case 1: Suppose 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v L ≥ 2θ 2 v H i.e., v H v L ≤ 3 2 (2 − θ). In this case, the L-type will always set (2v L , v L ) to earn Π L (2v L , v L ) = 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v L without trying to mimic the H-type. Hence, the H-type can set (2v H , v H ) to earn Π H (2v H , v H ) = 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v H and costless separation always exists.
Case 2: Suppose 2θ 2 v H > 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v L ≥ 2θ 2 p 1 i.e., . In this case, the L-type would prefer setting (2v H , v H ) over (2v L , v L ), provided she is able to deceive the uninformed backer. Since both types could set (2v H , v H ), the uninformed backer relies on the observed number of pledges, n, and pledge at price v H only if n = 2. Based on this belief, Π H (2v H , v H ) = 2 θ 3 6 (3v H ) + 4 θ 3 6 (2v H ) + 2 
If the H-type indeed chooses (2v H , v H ), it contradicts that posterior belief of the uninformed backer since the H-type would be the only one choosing this campaign design. Thus, a costly separating equilibrium exists as long as the H-type does not choose (2v H , v H ).
Case 3: Suppose 2θ 2 p 1 > 3θ 2 (2−θ)v L ≥ 2θ 2 p 0 i.e., .
In this case, the L-type would prefer setting (2v H , v H ) as well as (2p 1 , p 1 ) over (2v L , v L ), provided she is able to deceive the uninformed backer. Therefore, on observing (2v H , v H ) or (2p 1 , p 1 ), the uninformed backer relies on the observed number of pledges, n. She would pledge at price v H only if n = 2 and at price p 1 only if n ≥ 1. Based on this belief, 3 (3 − θ)p 1 , and (2p 0 , p 0 ) to earn Π H (2p 0 , p 0 ) = 3θ 2 (2 − θ)p 0 . The L-type chooses between (2v L , v L ) to earn Π L (2v L , v L ) = 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v L and (2p 1 , p 1 ) to earn Π L (2p 1 , p 1 ) = θ 2 p 1 . Therefore, either a costly separating or a pooling equilibrium might exist in this case. Similar to the previous case, an equilibrium does not exist if the H-type chooses (2v H , v H ). No equilibrium exists also if only one type of creator chooses (2p 1 , p 1 ), in which case, the uninformed backer's posterior belief should be independent of n, and hence is inconsistent.
Case 4: Suppose 2θ 2 p 0 > 3θ 2 (2 − θ)v L i.e., . In this case, the L-type would prefer setting (2v H , v H ), (2p 1 , p 1 ), or (2p 0 , p 0 ) over (2v L , v L ), provided she is able to deceive the uninformed backer. Since the uninformed backer would rely on the observed number of pledges, n, she would pledge at price v H only if n = 2, at price p 1 only if n ≥ 1, and always (i.e., n ≥ 0) at price p 0 . Based on this belief, Π H (2v H , v H ) = θ 2 3 (6 + θ)v H , Π H (2p 1 , p 1 ) = 4θ 2 3 (3 − θ)p 1 , and Π H (2p 0 , p 0 ) = 3θ 2 (2 − θ)p 0 ; while Π L (2v H , v H ) = 0, Π L (2p 1 , p 1 ) = θ 2 p 1 , and Π L (2p 0 , p 0 ) = 2θ 2 p 0 . For the L-type, choosing (2v L , v L ) leads to lower profit compared to choosing (2p 0 , p 0 ). Hence, she only chooses between (2p 1 , p 1 ) and (2p 0 , p 0 ). The H-type chooses between (3v H , v H ), (2v H , v H ), (2p 1 , p 1 ), or (2p 0 , p 0 ). To keep the posterior belief consistent, an equilibrium would only exist if both the H-type and the Ltype chooses the same campaign design between (2p 1 , p 1 ) and (2p 0 , p 0 ). Hence, only a pooling equilibrium might exist.
